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1.    Introduction
Recurrent fiscal imbalances in terms of tax and expenditure assign-
ments among central and local governments are a critical issue in 
public finance. To equalize tax capacities, cope with spillovers or to 
achieve national policy objectives, central governments often provide 
transfers to lower levels of government. These transfers may affect the 
incentives to improve fiscal performance because they may induce low 
tax effort in the regions (Litvack, Ahmad and Bird, 1998; Boadway 
et al., 1999). 
This point is particularly relevant for Brazil, as the Constitution 
of 1988 assured a substantial financial autonomy for subnational 
governments by increasing the share of public resources accruing 
to states and municipalities. However, this revenue decentraliza-
tion was not followed by a decentralization of responsibilities as no 
conditions were imposed concerning the use of the shared revenues. 
Concerning this “incomplete ﬁscal decentralization”, where spending 
authority is devolved to the subnational level while ﬁnancing relies 
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on transfers from the central government, two points deserve to be 
noticed. Firstly, the lack of tax capacity and managerial abilities for 
most of the municipalities and secondly, inflated municipalities’ ex-
penditures to match their increasing revenues. Additionally, the pro-
liferation of small cities without any fiscal viability and no reliable 
human resources led to significant imbalances that were transferred 
to the federal level (Rezende, 1995; Varsano and Mora, 2001).
To cope with the deterioration of municipal finances, a complex 
system of federal and state transfers set apart expenditure deci-
sions from tax capacity in local jurisdictions as the provision of local 
public goods rely heavily on those transfers.  In this scenario, the 
reduced productivity of local tax bases can be partly explained by 
their low tax effort, since it is less costly to obtain resources through 
transfers from other spheres of government than to exploit their own 
tax base. Even a greater reliance on property taxes has not increa-
sed the much required degree of fiscal autonomy at the local level. 
However, this dissociation between municipalities’ financing needs 
and their revenues cannot go on indefinitely. 
The upsurge of municipal expenses, brought about by the decentra-
lization of public spending granted by the 1988 Constitution and 
a higher urbanization, together with the fiscal strain faced by the 
higher levels of government threaten the perpetuation of the current 
model. For that reason, in recent years, there is an increasing empha-
sis on the necessity to increase municipalities’ tax capacity and the 
efficiency of tax collection. Hence, tax efficiency measurements are 
relevant for implementing a sound tax system. 
Traditionally, tax effort is computed as a ratio between the obser-
ved tax collection and its potential, where the latter comes from 
regression analysis or stochastic frontiers (Blanco, 1998; Baretti et 
al., 2000; Jha et al., 1999; Bahl, 1971). As an alternative to this 
approach, a few studies used nonparametric techniques such as 
DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis)1 to measure the productive 
efficiency of tax collection (Moesen and Persoon, 2002; Thirtle et 
al., 2000; Førsund et al., 2005; Barros, 2007). Yet, due to the de-
terministic nature of nonparametric models, inefficiencies due to 
the presence of atypical observations, measurement errors, omit-
ted variables, and other statistical discrepancies are not taken into 
1 Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978). 
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account. Additionally, when the dataset is both large and diverse, 
this problem is aggravated, leading to substantial underestimation 
of efficiency scores since the frontier is given by a small number of 
municipalities. Therefore, to make efficiency scores credible it is 
necessary to use an adequate procedure to correct those scores for 
outliers.
Moreover, although tax revenue is observable, one cannot rely uni-
quely on this variable to estimate tax effort. Indeed, tax collection is 
affected by many factors outside the control of municipalities such 
as political factors, socio-economic characteristics, and idiosyncratic 
shocks to some specific tax bases, which are seldom well controlled 
for when estimating tax capacity. Hence, the use of tax efficiency 
measures based only on controllable outputs and inputs may distort 
the observed performance of a given tax jurisdiction and lead to 
unreliable results. 
There are different ways to consider exogenous factors in a nonpa-
rametric framework. We can, for instance, introduce them direc-
tly as constraints in the linear program. The main shortcoming of 
this approach comes from the fact that due to the so called curse 
of dimensionality, for a fixed number of observations, the use of a 
multitude of parameters tends to overstate the efficiency of the ob-
servations. The second practice is to use a two-stage approach. In the 
first stage one computes DEA measures while treating all the inputs 
as controllable and then, in the second stage, regresses the “gross” 
computed efficiency scores on exogenous factors in order to get a 
“pure” measure of technical efficiency (McCarty and Yaisawarng, 
1993; Yu, 1998; Simar and Wilson, 2005). This two step approach 
allows to detect the factors that determines “gross” efficiency scores 
and it also permits to compute the “pure” managerial’” efficiency 
scores from the residuals of the regression. This procedure will be 
adopted in this study.
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the efficiency of tax col-
lection in Brazilian municipalities by applying a two-stage approach. 
Firstly, we will compute output-oriented robust DEA efficiency in-
dexes by using bootstrap and jackknife resampling techniques (“jack-
strap”) to correct for outliers and possible errors in the dataset. 
Secondly, we will regress the computed nonparametric scores on 
environmental variables to account for exogenous factors that might 
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affect the municipality’s performance and will use the regressions 
residuals to compute “pure” efficiency scores. Our approach differs 
from previous work by specifying a “pure” robust nonparametric 
efficiency index and in the use of quantile regression techniques. 
Robust indexes are particularly important when the dataset is both 
large and heterogeneous, as is our case. Finally, the use of quantile 
regression allows the impacts of the conditioning variables to differ 
across the distribution of tax efficiency scores. 
The paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 presents the background and 
Section 3 describes the methodology used to compute the outliers-
corrected DEA “pure” efficiency scores. Section 4 briefly descri-
bes the data for both stages. Sections 5 and 6 discuss the results 
and compare the technical efficiency scores with the residual ones. 
Finally, Section 7 summarizes the main conclusions. 
2. Background 
The first studies dealing with government tax performance were 
based on country level data. Bahl (1971), in a pioneer work, inves-
tigated this issue on a tax effort framework and set up the path 
for subsequent studies. Those tax effort models emphasized the 
importance of supply factors – e.g. the magnitude of the tax base 
and the existence of easily taxed economic activities – to explain 
country tax performances (Leuthold, 1991; Piancastelli, 2001). More 
recently, the conventional literature on tax effort was extended into 
several directions. Particular attention was given to the estimation 
of a production function based on stochastic tax frontiers (Battese 
and Coelli, 1992) to assess potential tax revenues; by comparing 
their results with the observed tax revenues, they computed tax 
effort indexes and hence, country tax performances (Jha et al., 1999; 
Esteller-Moré, 2005).  More recently, the tax effort models were 
extended to include demand characteristics such as corruption and 
accountability as determinants of tax effort and tax performance 
(Bird and Tarasov, 2008). Concomitantly, several studies applied 
these methodologies to government lower spheres (Jha et al., 1999; 
Bird and Tarasov, 2004). As for Brazil, Reis and Blanco (1996) and 
Ribeiro (1998) analyzed tax performance by means of stochastic 
frontier methods for the Brazilian states and municipalities. In a 
subsequent work, Blanco (1998) used a two stage methodology, in 
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which the tax effort indexes from the first stage were regressed 
on several variables that could influence tax effort. Those studies 
concluded that transfers, by acting as a substitute to tax collection, 
had a negative effect on tax efficiency of the states and municipali-
ties. Posterior analyses focused on specific regions, included capital 
revenues, labor market informality and municipal characteristics to 
explain tax inefficiencies following the line of traditional tax effort 
models. Vasconcelos et al. (2006) and Orair and Alencar (2010), 
on the other hand, estimated tax effort of states and municipalities 
in Brazil by using OLS regressions. Finally, a few studies computed 
tax efficiency scores for subnational government levels by means of 
nonparametric methods such as DEA (Gasparini and Melo, 2004). 
However, these studies, besides using a naïve version of those me- 
thods, do not try to explain the calculated tax efficiency scores. 
This paper links the tax effort literature with efficiency analysis by 
means of a two stage approach that combines advanced nonparame-
tric techniques and quantile regression models to compute tax effi-
ciency indexes and identify environment variables – not controlled 
by tax administrators – that may affect tax efficiency (implicit tax 
effort) for the Brazilian municipalities. This enables us to compu-
te “pure” efficiency indexes, which reflect only differences in tax 
management.  
3.  Methodology
Nonparametric methods, such as DEA have been widely used to 
evaluate relative performance in different areas. These techniques, 
based on productivity analysis (Koopmans, 1951, Farrel, 1957) do 
not impose a parametric structure, but require only weak assump-
tions concerning the production technology such as convexity, free 
disposal and scale restrictions. The main drawbacks of DEA is that 
the resulting efficiency scores are influenced by the presence of 
Decision Making Units (DMUs) that perform extremely well (the so 
called outliers), which indicate outstanding practices or may simply 
be the result of errors in the data. In either case, the results for the 
remaining DMUs are shifted downwards, the efficiency frequency 
distribution becomes highly asymmetric, and the overall efficiency 
scale becomes non-linear. Several authors have considered this effect. 
Wilson (1993) introduced descriptive methods to detect influential 
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observations in nonparametric efficiency calculations. More recent 
developments of this important issue include the order-m frontiers 
(Simar, 2003; Cazals, Florens and Simar, 2002) and the Robust 
Efficiency Frontier (Cherchye, Kuosmanen and Post, 2000).
Yet, these approaches are heavily dependent on manual inspection of 
data, which becomes virtually impossible for large data sets. To tack-
le this issue, we shall use a method recently proposed by Sampaio de 
Sousa and Stosic (2005), which combines bootstrap and jackknife re-
sampling schemes for automatic detection of outliers. This approach 
is based on the concept of leverage, that is, the effect produced on 
the outcome of DEA efficiencies of all the other DMUs when the 
observed DMU is removed from the data set. Leverage measures 
are calculated for each DMU, and it is then used to detect outliers 
and to eliminate them in an automated fashion, or to just reduce 
their influence. The underlying idea is that outliers are expected to 
display leverage much above the mean leverage, and hence should be 
selected with lower probability than the other DMUs when resam-
pling is performed. Below, we will describe this method.
 
3.1   First Step: Naive and Robust Technical Efficiency Scores
Suppose the existence of K DMUs. The technology converts non-
negative inputs 1( ,..., )
k N
k kNx x x    into nonnegative outputs
1( ,..., )
k M
k kMy y y   . The production set of the feasible input-
output combinations, given by T = {(x, y): x can produce y}, can be 
described by the output requirement set,  ( ) ( , ) .MP x y x y T  
Returns of scale, r, require that if Tyx ∈),( , then ( , )x y T  ,
( )S r  , where r = “crs” stands for constant returns to scale, 
r  = “drs” for decreasing returns and r = “vrs” for variable returns; 
S(crs) = R+, S(drs) = [0, 1] and S(vrs) = {1}.
The radial efficient boundary of T corresponds to the frontier trans-
formation function, ∂P(x):
                            (1)
Here, we move to the frontier by expanding outputs while keeping 
inputs fixed. The output-oriented measure of efficiency for a DMU at 
(x, y) is given by:
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  ( , ) sup ( )x y y P x                                                 (2) 
As T and )(xP∂ are unknown, the efficiency measures ( , )x y  have 
to be estimated. Among them, the most popular are the DEA esti-
mators. The DEA estimator of the output section of T  is:
  (3) 
Replacing T with its DEA estimator in )(,)( xPxP ∂ gives, respectively,
 
~~ ~~
( ) ( , )N DEAP x y x y T
    
 
                                                     (4)
 
~~ ~~ ~~
( ) ( ), ( ), 1NP x y x P x y P x 
        
 
                   (5)
Accordingly, the correspondent output-oriented measure of techni-
cal efficiency is: 
                    
          (6) 
3.2    Leverage and the “Jackstrap” Procedure 
The leverage of a single observed DMU might be understood as 
the impact of the removal of the DMU from the dataset on the 
efficiency scores of all the other DMUs. Formally, it may be de-
fined as the standard deviation of the post-removal efficiency mea-
sures from their pre-removal values. The straightforward possibility 
is to use jackknife resampling as follows. One first applies DEA 
using the unaltered, original dataset to obtain the set of efficiencies
 | 1, ,k k K    for each of the DMUs. Then, one by one, each DMU 
is successively removed from the dataset, and each time the set of 
efficiencies  is recalculated, where Kj ,,1 =  
indexes the removed DMU. The leverage of the j-th DMU may then 
be defined as
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 2*
1; .
1
K
kj k
k k j
j K
 
 





                                                 
  (7)
However, this approach is extremely computationally intensive and 
may prove unfeasible for large datasets. More precisely, removing each 
of the K DMUs from the data set and then performing (K-1) DEA 
calculations requires solving K (K-1) linear programming problems, 
which may become prohibitively expensive for large K. Sampaio de 
Sousa and Stosic (2005) proposed a more efficient stochastic proce-
dure, which combines bootstrap resampling with the above jackknife 
scheme as follows: 
Randomly select a subset of •	 L DMUs and perform the above 
procedure to obtain subset leverages 1
~
k  , where the index k  
takes on L (randomly selected) values from the set { }K,,1  .
Repeat the above step •	 B times, accumulating the subset leverage 
information kb  for all randomly selected DMUs (for B large 
enough, each DMU should be selected roughly /kn BL K  
times),
Calculate mean leverage for each DMU as •	
1
kn
kb
b
k
kn

 
                                                                       (8)
Compute the global mean leverage as•	
 
K
K
k
k∑
== 1
~
~

                                                                        
(9)
This completes the first phase of the proposed approach. In the 
second phase, one can either use the leverage measures to detect 
and simply eliminate outliers from the dataset, or one can imple-
ment a bootstrap method to produce confidence intervals and bias 
information, using leverage information to reduce the probability of 
selecting the identified outliers in the stochastic resampling process. 
The point here is how leverage information can be used to identify 
potential outliers (and/or errors). More precisely, after ordering the 
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DMUs according to their leverage values such that ji 
~~ ≥  for ji <
, a choice should be made as to what threshold leverage value o
~
 
should be used to warn of potential influential DMUs. Here, we will 
use the Heaviside step function, that takes into account leverage 
information and the sample size K as follows
 1)(
~
=klP , se Kll k log
~~
≤  e 0)(
~
=klP , se Kll k log
~~
>                (10)
where P(
~
kl ) is the probability of retaining k-th DMU, with leverage ~
kl . Here, to take into account the sample size K, the threshold level 
was chosen as the product of the global leverage 
~
l  and the natural 
logarithm of K. 
3.3    Second Step:  Residual Efficiency Scores
Let 1( ,..., ) 'k    be the vector of efficiency scores, X a matrix of 
dimension K x p containing the municipality characteristics, β a p-
dimensional vector of unknown parameters and u a K-dimensional 
vector of random errors. We can write a regression model as 
 ln ( ; ) , 1,...,k k kf x u k K                                       (11)
Notice that the above expression may be seen as the decomposition 
of the gross efficiency score, ,k into two parts: the exogenous com-
ponent, given by  ( ; )kf x   and the managerial performance, given by 
ku . More precisely, this estimated residual represents the deviation 
from the mean managerial performance that would be observed in 
a given environment.  Hence, the residual (or “pure” technical ef-
ficiency) for the k-th municipality, Efk, is given by:
 maxexp( ), 1,..., .k kEf u u k K                                        (12)
Where umax is the maximum of {uk}. The municipality with the highest 
positive u will be considered efficient. Note that the scores defined 
by [12] are purged from exogenous factors. By construction the new 
efficiency measure will be between 0 and 1. These scores will serve to 
rank the communes and this ranking will be confronted with the one 
obtained by using the nonparametric measures in the first stage. 
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4. Data
The implementation of the methods presented above requires data 
on municipal tax revenues (outputs) and information on inputs to 
compute nonparametric efficiency scores as well as information on 
municipal characteristics that will be used to calculate pure scores. 
For the first step, tax revenues for 2902 tax jurisdictions (muni-
cipalities) for the year 2004 were obtained from the National 
Treasury Secretariat (Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional, STN) and 
are in 2004 Brazilian Reais. We considered only tax revenues de-
rived from taxes collected by the municipality. Other sources of 
revenues such as grants from State and Central governments and 
credit operations were excluded. The following taxes were consi-
dered: (a) Tax on Real State Property (Imposto sobre a Propriedade 
Predial e Territorial Urbana, IPTU), (b) Tax on Services (Imposto 
sobre Serviços de Qualquer Natureza, ISSQN), (c) Income Tax 
on Municipal Government’s Payroll (Imposto de Renda Retido 
nas Fontes sobre o Rendimento do Trabalho, IRRF),2 (d)  Tax on 
Property Transmission (Imposto sobre Transmissão “Inter Vivos” 
de Bens Móveis e de Direitos Reais sobre Imóveis, ITBI), (e) Local 
Police Services Fees (Taxas pelo Poder de Polícia, TPP), (f) Public 
Services Fees (Taxas pela Prestação de Serviços, TPS) and (g) the 
Improvement Contribution (Contribuição de Melhoria, CM). Those 
taxes have a high correlation with the economic base of the tax juris-
diction – activity, income and wealth – and are assigned to the muni-
cipality. They are controlled by the municipality, and thus constitute 
an appropriated measure to compute tax efficiency and tax effort. 
To compute tax efficiency scores, we grouped local taxes into five 
products. P1 comprehends tax revenues accruing from IPTU and P2 
accounts for those coming from ISSQN. Together, these taxes repre-
sent approximately 50% of total municipal tax revenues. P3 stands 
for the other tax revenues, corresponding to the sum of IRRF, ITBI, 
TPP, TPS and CM. However, municipalities’ tax effort is not res-
tricted to tax collection. It also requires a constant strain to update 
their tax base. For that reason, we used the production of taxpayer 
cadastres as an output. So, the output P4 is the quantity of buildings 
2   Although the IRRF is assigned to the federal government, this tax, levied upon municipal 
personnel expenses, are collected by the municipality and, by constitutional determination, 
are administered and used by them. Hence, as the IRRF doesn’t enter into the “Conta Única 
da União”, by the vigent accounting rules, this tax is registered as municipal tax revenue.
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and unbuilt land that are registered in the cadastre of the IPTU and P5 
corresponds to the number of firms and individual taxpayers registered 
in the cadastre of the ISSQN. As for inputs, unfortunately we do not 
have separate information on the costs incurred by the municipalities to 
collect taxes. So, we used as a proxy for inputs, administrative expen-
ditures (I1) and the number of municipal employees (I2). The former 
contemplate expenditures associated with the municipal bureaucracy, 
from which the tax bureaucracy represents a substantial part, and the 
latter stands for the labor inputs. As the communes do not provide a 
separated estimate, the number of municipal clerks overestimates the 
personnel engaged on the tax administration tasks. A complete list of 
inputs and outputs is provided in Table 4.1, together with their descrip-
tive statistics and respective sources.
Table 4.1 - Descriptive Statistics for Inputs and Outputs – 2004
Inputs and Outputs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. Source
Inputs       
   I1. Municipal employees (#) 1,008 430 3,468 52 156,474 IBGEa
   I2. Administrative expenses (R$) 5,148,899 1,401,535 18,164,636 1,385 401,942,788 STNb
Outputs       
   P1. IPTUc revenues (R$) 2,290,150 66,688 40,567,891 12 2,121,682,423 STN
   P2. ISSQNd revenues (R$) 2,934,219 118,899 49,742,507 43 2,592,542,002 STN
   P3. Other tax revenuese (R$) 1,906,623 230,265 22,683,412 2 1,142,432,280 STN
   P4. Registries in IPTU cadastref (#) 14,726 3,557 62,751 96 2,722,881 IBGE
   P5. Registries in ISSQN cadastreg (#) 2,625 266 30,593 1 1,512,986 IBGE
(a) Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística), “Perfil dos 
municípios brasileiros: gestão pública 2004”; (b) National Treasury Secretariat (Secretaria do Tesouro Nacio-
nal), “Finanças do Brasil - Dados Contábeis dos Municípios – 2004”; (c) Tax on real state property; (d) Tax 
on services; (e) The sum of revenues from the income tax on municipal government’s payroll (IRRF), the tax 
on property transmission (ITBI), the local police services fees (TPP), the public services fees (TPS) and the 
improvement contribution (CM); (f) Buildings and unbuilt lands; (g) Firms and individual taxpayers.
In the second step, to estimate Equation [11], the dependent va-
riable is the natural logaritm of the jackstrapped efficient sco-
res for both DEA variants for the year 2004. Data for matrix X, 
containing municipal characteristics come from a cross section 
data set for two distinct samples, each one including 2734 muni-
cipalities. Both are subsamples of the original sample of 2902 
communes. Differences between the original sample and these 
subsamples are due to (a) exclusion of outliers by the jackstrap 
method and (b) data availability for municipal characteristics. 
Table 4.2 shows descriptive statistics and sources for the indepen-
dent variables used in the second stage.  
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5.    “Jackstrapped” Results
In this section we present the results from applying the “Jackstrap” 
procedure described in Section 3 to the data discussed in Section 
4. We will first comment the leverage results, then we present the 
outlier detection process by using the Heaviside step function, and 
finally we discuss robust DEA efficiency calculations.
5.1.   Leverages  
Leverages were calculated for 2902 municipalities for output-orien-
ted DEA-CRS and DEA-VRS. Table 5.1 presents leverages for the 
30 most influential municipalities. Let us now briefly comment the 
results. Distinct and non excludable groups of influential DMUs are 
identified: firstly, we have municipalities for which all output-input 
ratios were well above the average. Examples of such cases are São 
Paulo, Belém, Curitiba and Belo Horizonte. In the second group, high 
leverages are due to a distortion in the ratio between the number of 
registries in the cadastre of IPTU and the number of municipal em-
ployees; this is the case of Balneário Gaivota, Iguape and Balneário 
Arroio do Silva. Finally, many of those super efficient cities are small 
towns located in touristy areas close to large and densely populated 
urban areas. Their valuable real state property as well as a more di-
versified offer of services contributes to increase their tax base; they 
also tend to have lower administrative expenses and hence higher 
ratio between tax revenues and these expenses. For instance, those 
rations are 3.9, 4.4 and 5.1, respectively, for Caldas Novas, Ubatuba 
and Praia Grande whereas the average ratio is only 0.5.
As expected, leverage values are lower when we use the DEA-VRS 
model. The higher number of efficient municipalities produced by 
this variant contributes to mask the problem of outliers. However, 
as the leverage results in this model are simply scaled down with 
respect to the ones obtained by the DEA-CRS variant, the identifi-
cation of outliers, by using the “Jackstrap” method, is similar in both 
models as can be seen from the ranks shown in Table 5.1.
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Municipality
DEA-CRS DEA-VRS
Rank Leverage Rank Leverage
São Paulo – SP 1 0.1986 1 0.1148
Belém – PA 2 0.1226 2 0.1072
Curitiba – PR 3 0.1121 7 0.0560
Caldas Novas - GO 4 0.1107 4 0.0811
Iguape – SP 5 0.1045 11 0.0502
Belo Horizonte - MG 6 0.0976 17 0.0346
São Caetano do Sul - SP 7 0.0967 15 0.0360
Balneário Gaivota - SC 8 0.0918 5 0.0609
Santana do Livramento - RS 9 0.0884 71 0.0137
Palhoça – SC 10 0.0872 6 0.0564
Poá - SP 11 0.0838 10 0.0511
Balneário Arroio do Silva - SC 12 0.0837 12 0.0432
Ubatuba – SP 13 0.0776 14 0.0385
Praia Grande - SP 14 0.0765 13 0.0428
Jundiaí – SP 15 0.0710 29 0.0255
Criciúma – SC 16 0.0700 172 0.0041
Salvador – BA 17 0.0699 16 0.0357
Rolim de Moura - RO 18 0.0680 36 0.0217
Conselheiro Lafaiete - MG 19 0.0676 19 0.0344
Macaé – RJ 20 0.0669 274 0.0014
Itapema – SC 21 0.0609 40 0.0201
Passo Fundo - RS 22 0.0519 25 0.0283
Jaguaruna – SC 23 0.0506 22 0.0317
São Vicente - SP 24 0.0505 55 0.0166
Planaltina – GO 25 0.0502 35 0.0219
Porto Alegre - RS 26 0.0482 39 0.0204
Rio Acima - MG 27 0.0476 38 0.0209
Vitória – ES 28 0.0470 122 0.0073
Vila Velha – ES 29 0.0465 67 0.0144
Nova Friburgo - RJ 30 0.0461 294 0.0011
   
Table 5.1 - Leverages for Selected Municipalities
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5.2.   Outlier Detection 
As mentioned in Section 3, in order to determine which municipali-
ties should be considered outliers, we will use a Heaviside rule to re-
move outliers (Equation [10]). We removed 66 and 52 municipalities, 
respectively, for DEA-CRS and the DEA-VRS variants. It should be 
noted that even when a city displays only local influence such e.g. 
Planaltina, and hence has little effect on the overall efficiency scores, 
our “Jackstrap” procedure identifies this anomalous case. As it per-
forms a comparison in B different random “bubbles”, where it turns 
out that this city often demonstrates a high level of influence, it 
obtains a high leverage value. Hence, the “Jackstrap” procedure com-
bined with the threshold value defined by the Heaviside function 
provide a reasonable and automated approximation of the number 
of outliers. Of course as any cutoff level, this is somewhat arbitrary 
but it proved to be, in our experience, a quite robust rule.3
5.3.    Efficiency Indexes 
The histograms of efficiency indices obtained through DEA-CRS 
calculations on the whole dataset and after removing 66 municipa-
lities with highest leverage, are shown in Figure 5.1. It is seen that 
removing the high leverage DMUs generates substantial changes on 
the overall efficiency scores, whose distribution was originally highly 
asymmetric and shifted towards the lower efficiency side, as may 
be expected in the presence of outliers. It should be noted that the 
number of removed DMUs represents less than 2.5% of the original 
sample. 
3    For a more detailed discussion of the impact of selecting different cutoff rules in a control-
led environment, see Sampaio de Sousa and Stosic (2005).  
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Figure 5.1 - Histograms of DEA-CRS Tax Efficiency Scores obtained by using 
the Original Dataset and after Removing 66 Municipalities with the 
Highest Leverages
Table 5.2 summarizes the results obtained according to two DEA 
variants. As expected, the DEA naïve frontiers are formed by a few 
municipalities. The uncorrected scores are quite distorted, with the 
majority of efficiencies being close to zero. Here, the presence of 
outliers not only affects the number of efficient municipalities, but 
also substantially influences the magnitude of the computed scores, 
particularly when the DEA-CRS technique is used. Indeed, between 
the uncorrected score and its equivalent using the Heaviside step 
function, the average efficiency scores doubles. Observe also that 
the skewness as well as the kurtosis drops substantially when the ou-
tliers are removed, indicating that the distribution of the efficiency 
scores thus obtained is closest to the normal distribution. 
Table 5.2 - Descriptive Statistics for DEA-CRS and DEA-VRS Efficiency 
Scores
Methodologies
Included 
observations
Efficient (#)
Descriptive Statistics 
Mean Median Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
DEA-CRS        
   Uncorrected 2902 (0)a 10 0.151 0.117 0.124 2.818 12.302
   Heaviside 2836 (66) 30 0.344 0.281 0.223 1.133 0.689
DEA-VRS        
   Uncorrected 2902 (0) 21 0.188 0.148 0.149 2.433 8.314
   Heaviside 2850 (52) 113 0.397 0.338 0.240 0.956 0.187
(a) The numbers of removed outliers are between parentheses.
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6. Residual Efficiency Scores 
To complement the nonparametric analysis carried out on Section 5, 
we will investigate the environmental factors affecting the efficiency 
scores by using OLS and quantile regression methods. The residuals 
of this regression measure pure technical efficiency after accounting 
for noncontrollable factors. 
6.1.  The Econometric Model
Since the efficiency scores are restricted to assume values within 
the standard unit interval (0 < λ < 1), the Ordinary Least Squared 
(OLS) estimator of the vector of regression parameters will be in-
consistent in the sense that it will not converge on probability to the 
true unknown parameter. However, it has been shown in the litera-
ture that the use of ln  as dependent variable leads to unbiased 
OLS estimates if the computed scores only assume strictly positive 
values. Furthermore, when the dependent variable is censored, the 
OLS estimator of the linear regression parameters will not be consis-
tent and such inconsistency worsens with the proportion of censored 
observations in the sample.4 This result implies that the problem 
of inconsistency will not be serious when the number of censored 
observation is small.  
Censored observations may be appropriately tackled using the 
Tobit model. In this model, parameters are usually estimated by 
Maximum Likelihood (ML) under the assumptions of normality and 
homoskedasticity. It is noteworthy that the absence of normality as 
well as the presence of heteroskedasticity will lead to inconsistent 
parameter estimates. 
In what follows, we shall use the linear regression model instead of 
the Tobit model. The reasons for that choice are as follows: 
Contrary to the Tobit model, estimation in the linear model does 1. 
not require the assumption of normality; this assumption can be 
quite restrictive since we have no prior information about the 
distribution of the data. Even if is possible to define the Tobit model 
using nonnormal distributions, the main shortcoming remains: 
distributional misspecification will render unreliable inference.  
4   A proof of this result, under some regularity conditions, is given in Greene (1981).
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The OLS estimator in the linear regression model is unbiased, 2. 
consistent and asymptotically normal even under neglected 
heteroskedasticity of unknown form; the same does not hold for 
the ML estimator in the Tobit model.     
It is possible to obtain an estimate for the covariance matrix of the 3. 
OLS estimator of β that is consistent under both homoskedasticity 
and heteroskedasticity of unknown form (see below); hence, 
one can perform hypothesis tests that are asymptotically valid 
regardless of the structure of the error variances and of the error 
distribution. These convenient properties do not hold in the Tobit 
framework. 
The proportion of censored observations in the sample is small 4. 
(around 1.8%). 
Therefore, we will investigate the exogenous factors, using OLS and 
quantile regression methods, as introduced by Koenker and Bassett 
(1978). Just as classical linear regression allows one to estimate mo-
dels for conditional mean functions; quantile regression methods 
offer a mechanism for estimating models for the conditional median 
function, and also for other conditional quantile functions. This al-
lows us to investigate the impacts of the conditioning variables on 
the efficiency scores across different efficiency percentiles. The ba-
sic idea is to estimate the τ-th quantile of efficiency conditional on 
the different explanatory variables, assuming that this quantile may 
be expressed as a linear predictor based on these variables. We con-
sidered the following conditional quantiles: 0.10 (percentile 10%), 
0.25 (lower quartile), 0.50 (median), 0.75 (upper quartile) e 0.90 
(percentile 90%). The dependent variables are the natural logarithms 
of the efficiency scores for two distinct samples of 2734 Brazilian 
municipalities computed by using the DEA-CRS and DEA-VRS. 
Note that the estimated coefficients are conditional to the values 
obtained by the DEA scores and thus they do not take into account 
the uncertainty associated to those scores. 
Table 6.1 presents the econometric results. Let us begin with the 
analysis of the impact of fiscal transfers on tax efficiency. This is a 
relevant issue as it seems to exist a problem of moral hazard in the 
design of central and state government grants to local governments. 
Since local conditions are unknown to higher spheres of government, 
municipalities can easily hide their tax potential in order to qualify 
for a higher share of resources from these spheres. Because its cost is 
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shared by national and regional taxpayers, grants may function then 
as a substitute for fiscal effort, stimulating inefficiency. To test this 
hypothesis, we regress tax efficiency scores on grants received by the 
communes from higher government spheres (Grants). Our results 
strongly confirm those views. The negative and significant coeffi-
cients associated to the variable “grants” show that the greater the 
proportion of municipalities’ expenditure financed by central and 
state grants, the lower is their tax efficiency. These results corrobo-
rate previous studies5 and reaffirm the inverse relationship between 
grants and tax effort and tax efficiency. Concerning the regional 
impact, belonging to the Northeast and Northern regions reduces 
the municipality’s tax efficiency in the OLS model. This is hardly 
surprising as these regions concentrate the poorest communes, which 
are basically financed by grants from higher government spheres. 
However, quantile estimates moderate this conclusion. Indeed, this 
result is significant only for the municipalities situated in the me-
dian quantile. Besides, except for the Center-West, the estimated 
coefficients are not significant for the last quantiles (τ = 0.75 e τ = 
0.90) signaling that for tax jurisdictions relatively efficient, location 
is not relevant to explain tax variations. Finally, probably due to tax 
spillovers, belonging to a metropolitan area increases efficiency. 
5 Reis and Blanco (1996); Ribeiro (1998); Blanco (1998).
Table 6.1 - Tax Efficiency determinants for Brazilian Municipalities 
OLS and Quantile Regression Estimates
Independent 
Variables
Dependent variable: natural log of DEA-CRS scores Dependent variable: natural log of DEA-VRS scores
OLS τ = 0.1 τ = 0.25 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.75 τ = 0.9 OLS τ = 0.1 τ = 0.25 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.75 τ = 0.9
coeff.     
p-value
coeff.     
p-value
coeff.     
p-value
coeff.     
p-value
coeff.     
p-value
coeff.     
p-value
coeff.     
p-value
coeff.     
p-value
coeff.     
p-value
coeff.     
p-value
coeff.     
p-value
coeff.     
p-value
Constant 7.305 10.163 8.196 8.845 7.460 3.015 3.124 7.418 4.183 4.821 1.480 -3.324
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0270 0.0034 0.0000 0.0008 0.0001 0.2033 0.0227
Grants -1.322 -1.436 -1.344 -1.228 -1.369 -1.228 -0.562 -0.912 -0.706 -0.651 -0.436 -0.296
< 2e-16 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0172
North -0.080 -0.135 -0.128 -0.070 0.005 0.117 -0.125 -0.327 -0.164 -0.208 0.012 0.061
0.0894 0.0804 0.0515 0.2729 0.9669 0.2693 0.0221 0.0213 0.0008 0.0372 0.9046 0.3637
Northeast -0.089 -0.085 -0.079 -0.108 -0.056 -0.005 -0.084 -0.068 -0.045 -0.111 -0.065 0.061
0.0064 0.0707 0.0818 0.0050 0.2306 0.9198 0.0260 0.2217 0.3209 0.0156 0.1754 0.4179
Center-West 0.155 0.151 0.109 0.135 0.179 0.234 0.052 0.025 0.030 0.049 0.061 0.108
0.0000 0.0060 0.0043 0.0002 0.0000 0.0004 0.1615 0.5868 0.5058 0.2403 0.0718 0.0044
South 0.031 0.142 0.071 0.063 0.024 -0.012 0.032 0.057 0.088 0.043 -0.005 -0.040
0.1903 0.0000 0.0115 0.0106 0.3606 0.6970 0.2404 0.1157 0.0047 0.1230 0.8405 0.3792
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Independent 
Variables
Dependent variable: natural log of DEA-CRS scores Dependent variable: natural log of DEA-VRS scores
OLS τ = 0.1 τ = 0.25 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.75 τ = 0.9 OLS τ = 0.1 τ = 0.25 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.75 τ = 0.9
coeff.     
p-value
coeff.     
p-value
coeff.     
p-value
coeff.     
p-value
coeff.     
p-value
coeff.     
p-value
coeff.     
p-value
coeff.     
p-value
coeff.     
p-value
coeff.     
p-value
coeff.     
p-value
coeff.     
p-value
Metropolitan 0.112 0.117 0.102 0.107 0.105 0.051 0.099 0.093 0.076 0.083 0.096 0.034
0.0003 0.0089 0.0086 0.0003 0.0184 0.2730 0.0048 0.0067 0.0428 0.0119 0.0013 0.4364
Population 0.269 0.265 0.218 0.378 0.223 0.164 0.713 0.737 0.689 0.919 0.678 0.470
0.0087 0.0060 0.1083 0.0000 0.0813 0.2912 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0042
Urbanization rate 0.579 0.726 0.689 0.582 0.491 0.528 0.413 0.690 0.655 0.377 0.252 0.033
< 2e-16 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.7293
Per capita income 0.118 0.163 0.145 0.113 0.084 0.039 0.044 0.082 0.064 0.021 0.004 -0.014
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0364 0.0258 0.0002 0.0015 0.1369 0.8080 0.4844
Poverty rate -0.464 -0.386 -0.503 -0.542 -0.531 -0.725 -0.820 -0.796 -0.872 -0.963 -1.040 -1.052
0.0000 0.0170 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Industrial share 
of GDP
0.283 0.301 0.199 0.215 0.258 0.383 0.076 0.028 0.062 0.004 0.113 0.205
0.0000 0.0000 0.0080 0.0007 0.0005 0.0001 0.2638 0.7892 0.4014 0.9530 0.0882 0.0595
Services share 
of GDP
0.002 0.121 0.067 0.066 0.101 0.115 0.207 0.076 0.217 0.173 0.419 0.505
0.9811 0.2121 0.3941 0.3726 0.2190 0.2490 0.0059 0.4623 0.0141 0.0397 0.0000 0.0000
Unbuilt land IPTU 0.761 0.741 0.669 0.820 0.911 0.777 0.875 0.876 0.808 0.957 0.959 0.753
< 2e-16 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 < 2e-16 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Firms ISSQN 0.061 0.058 0.077 0.065 0.041 0.026 -0.015 0.017 0.040 0.026 -0.009 -0.106
0.0382 0.1950 0.0478 0.0596 0.3011 0.5959 0.6675 0.7279 0.3343 0.5182 0.8169 0.0521
Tax concentration -0.032 -0.206 -0.050 -0.007 0.033 0.097 0.036 -0.029 -0.044 0.102 0.049 0.171
0.5289 0.0069 0.4451 0.9027 0.6136 0.2192 0.5425 0.7382 0.5232 0.1405 0.4670 0.0540
Personnel 
expenses
-0.410 -0.562 -0.522 -0.421 -0.329 -0.256 -0.710 -0.685 -0.662 -0.565 -0.622 -0.501
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0123 0.1013 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0009
e-IPTU cadastre 0.143 0.217 0.201 0.131 0.076 0.136 0.078 0.173 0.175 0.015 0.005 0.062
0.0003 0.0000 0.0057 0.0229 0.2355 0.0086 0.0889 0.0003 0.0028 0.7825 0.9038 0.5351
e-ISSQN cadastre 0.105 0.050 0.114 0.108 0.144 0.103 0.078 0.045 0.083 0.095 0.098 0.100
0.0000 0.1662 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0114 0.0062 0.4003 0.0157 0.0077 0.0180 0.1460
Year of 
establishment
-0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 0.001
< 2e-16 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0041 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0539 0.0467
Included observations: 2734
Adjusted R2: 0.6059
Residual Std. Error: 0.409
F-statistic: 222.3
p-value: <2.2e-16
Included observations: 2734
Adjusted R2: 0.4234
Residual Std. Error: 0.478
F-statistic: 104.9
p-value: <2.2e-16
Scale variables - Urbanization rate and Population – have a positive 
and significant effect upon efficiency. Concerning population, the 
positive effect is well pronounced for both DEA variants. Hence, 
corroborating previous studies [Thirtle et al., 2000; Forsund et al., 
(Continued)
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2005], we found that the size of the tax jurisdiction is one of the 
most important determinant of tax collection efficiency. As for ur-
banization, the positive and significant coefficients attached to this 
variable probably reflect the concentration of dwellings and econo-
mic activity on urban areas as well as the economies of scale on fiscal 
administration brought about by the economies of agglomeration 
that characterizes high density areas.
Among tax capacity factors – Industrial share of GDP and Service 
share of GDP, Per capita income and Poverty rate – per capita income 
and poverty rate are the most relevant. The former positively in-
fluences efficiency, but its effect decreases across quantiles. Poverty 
rates – measured by the share of the total population earning a mon-
thly household income inferior to R$ 75.50 – are supposed to cap-
ture tax base reductions caused by irregular property, tax reduction 
and exemptions and informality. Negative and significant coefficients 
support this view for both DEA variants. The Industrial share of 
GDP is significant only when we use the DEA-CRS variant. As the 
service tax is an important source of tax collection for municipali-
ties, we would expect the related variable (Service share of GDP) 
to influence positively the efficiency scores. Yet, while having the 
correct sign, the coefficients associated to this variable are signifi-
cant only for the DEA-VRS model; and even here, the coefficient for 
the lowest quantile is not significant. This result may be explained 
by the fact that, in Brazil, the service sector shows a high degree of 
informality that leads to fiscal evasion. 
Together, scale and capacity factors tend to imply that the price paid 
by the smallest and poorest tax jurisdictions is reduced efficiency of 
tax collection. For these units taxation efficiency can be improved 
mainly by increasing the size of tax jurisdictions and by enlarging 
their tax base. 
Concerning the characteristics of taxpayer payer cadastres for IPTU 
and ISSQN, two points should be considered. Firstly, as the IPTU 
rates are higher for unbuilt land, we expect that municipalities with 
a higher proportion of those lands collect more IPTU revenues, le-
ading to higher efficiency scores for these communes. The estima-
ted coefficients for the variable Unbuilt Land IPTU, positive and 
strongly significant, confirm our hypothesis. Secondly, for taxes on 
services (ISSQN), one might argue that is easier to audit firms than 
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individual taxpayers. To test this hypothesis, we regressed the effi-
ciency scores on the proportion of firms in the total registries in the 
cadastre of the ISSQN (Firms ISSQN). Our findings weakly confirm 
this assumption and only for the lower quantiles of the DEA-CRS 
variant. 
Advocates of tax diversification by local governments have been 
found in the specialized literature. They argue that such a diversi-
fication not only would reduce the reliance on property taxes to fi-
nance local expenditures, but should also reduce the deadweight loss 
of the tax system, for a given revenue, by broadening the tax base 
and cutting rates. This, together with fiscal illusion that leads to the 
underestimation of the tax price, should diminish taxpayer resistan-
ce to tax increases that would lead to higher tax collection (Becker 
and Mulligan, 1998; Buchanan and Wagner, 1977). To consider this 
hypothesis we used the share of property and services taxes on total 
tax revenues (Tax Concentration). We expect that the greater this 
ratio, the lower the efficiency. The estimated coefficients, although 
negative, are not significant. Hence we do not find any evidence that 
diversifying tax base boosts revenue and tax efficiency. 
Finally, the rigidity of personnel expenses, measured by the percen-
tage of total revenues destined to pay salaries and wages taxes over 
the period 1998/2000, has a negative impact on tax efficiency. This 
result is quite robust across quantiles and methodologies. It points 
out that having a substantial share of revenues earmarked with per-
sonnel expenses jeopardize the flexibility required to promote ad-
ministrative reforms that include cutting costs and reallocating re-
sources into more productivity activities in terms of tax collecting. 
This rigidity effect is more harmful to inefficient communes located 
in the lowest quantile. 
Let us now investigate the managerial capability of tax jurisdictions. 
Firstly, we include two dummy variables to capture the moderni-
zation of tax administration: the existence of electronic cadastres 
of taxpayers for the tax on real state property (e-IPTU cadastre) 
and for the tax on services (e-ISSQN cadastre) taxpayers. Here the 
CRS and VRS model diverge. When we use the DEA-CRS variant, 
coefficients for the dummy e-IPTU cadastre are significant except 
for the municipalities on quantile τ = 0.75; thus, having IPTU elec-
tronic taxpayer cadastres improve the efficiency of tax collection. 
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However, with the DEA-VRS model, the coefficients are significant 
only for the lowest quantiles signaling that once the communes reach 
a certain level of efficiency in collecting taxes, having electronic ca-
dastre is no longer relevant to explain efficiency. As for the dummy 
e-ISSQN cadastre, coefficients are positive and significant; never-
theless, for the VRS model, this variable is not significant for the 
extreme quantiles. 
Secondly, the recent proliferation of small municipalities in Brazil, 
which lack not only a sound tax base, but also experience and mana-
gerial capability to collect taxes, may lead to reduced tax efficiency. 
We expect that established municipalities have a better knowledge 
of its tax base and a more structured tax collecting system. To test 
for that, we used the year when the municipal government was offi-
cially established (Year of establishment) as a proxy for expertise on 
administrative matters, including tax administration. The negative 
and significant coefficients for all quantiles obtained by both DEA 
methods, shows clearly that the newer the commune, the less effi-
cient in terms of collecting tax revenues, even when we control for 
other factors such as size and capacity tax factors.
6.2. “Pure” Efficiency Scores 
Using Expression [12] we computed the residual efficiency scores for 
the Brazilian municipalities by using the DEA-CRS and DEA-VRS 
variants. Table 6.2 presents technical and residual tax efficiency in-
dexes for the ten most efficient and least efficient municipalities. 
For lack of space, we will show results only for the DEA-CRS me-
thod. Firstly, when we take into account noncontrolable factors, tax 
jurisdictions situated at the top of the distribution reduce substan-
tially their efficiency scores. This is the case for many touristy cities 
and summer resorts such as Arroio do Sal and Guarapari. Their 
high tax revenues are not solely due to an efficient tax administra-
tion; they are rather explained by the fact that those communes 
concentrate a rich population that consumes high priced services 
and owns valuable property thus making IPTU and ISSQN much 
easier to collect. An obvious case is Guarapari, which is efficient 
when the jackstrapped method is used and whose “pure” efficiency 
score is only 0.2357. As for Águas de Lindóia and Águas de Santa 
Bárbara, they are small water springs resorts that collect a substan-
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tial amount of ISSQN, related to hotel industry and other tourism 
activities. These quite particular circumstances do not recommend 
such municipalities as role models for tax effort, as the non-adjusted 
efficiency indexes would suggest. Their particular situation cannot 
be replicated for the typical tax jurisdiction and thus they do not 
really represent a feasible best practice.
Table 6.2 - DEA-CRS Tax Efficiency Scores for Selected Municipalities - 2004.
Municipality
Populationa 
(#)
Tax revenueb 
(103 R$)
Technical 
efficiency 
score (λk)
Rank
Residual 
efficiency 
score (Efk)
Rank
Most efficient       
Bauru - SP 344,258 52,983 1.0000 1 0.2105 1416
Piracicaba - SP 355,039 78,998 1.0000 1 0.2330 1134
Guarapari - ES 102,089 14,247 1.0000 1 0.2357 1103
Águas de Lindóia - SP 18,289 6,914 1.0000 1 0.2645 791
Franca - SP 315,770 40,710 1.0000 1 0.2678 763
Arroio do Sal - RS 6,423 2,467 1.0000 1 0.2830 655
Arujá - SP 70,248 14,742 1.0000 1 0.3051 500
Águas de Santa Bárbara - SP 5,907 2,740 1.0000 1 0.3119 459
Itu - SP 149,758 26,496 1.0000 1 0.3162 438
Rio Grande - RS 193,789 30,365 1.0000 1 0.3213 410
       
Least efficient       
Ponto dos Volantes - MG 11,349 157 0.1556 2259 0.2227 459
Ibirapuã - BA 6,483 374 0.1788 2073 0.2603 253
Caatiba - BA 18,484 390 0.1911 1972 0.2984 140
Cacimbinhas - AL 8,600 206 0.1853 2017 0.2820 182
Plácido de Castro - AC 15,931 77 0.1449 2338 0.2245 448
Piranhas - AL 22,854 465 0.1774 2085 0.2786 193
Carnaubeira da Penha - PE 10,007 244 0.0919 2684 0.1991 683
Granjeiro - CE 5,578 138 0.1639 2177 0.3123 116
Olho D’Água do Piauí - PI 2,113 49 0.1372 2386 0.2457 324
Tarrafas - CE 8,751 205 0.1437 2345 0.2746 204
Sources: (a) Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e 
Estatística, IBGE), “Perfil dos municípios brasileiros: gestão pública 2004”; (b) Natio-
nal Treasury Secretariat (Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional, STN), “Finanças do Brasil 
Dados Contábeis dos Municípios – 2004”.
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For the most inefficient tax jurisdictions, “pure” efficiency indexes 
are superior to the non-adjusted ones. Indeed, the worse the commu-
ne-specific conditions the greater the rise in the residual efficiency 
score. The typical municipality situated at the bottom of the effi-
ciency distribution is small, poor, with a very limited tax base. Their 
adverse environment makes them look much more inefficient than 
they really are. In that sense, residual scores present a more com-
plete picture of the municipality’s tax effort because the magnitude 
of the non-adjusted indexes reflects factors other than managerial 
efficiency. Hence, when we take into account environmental factors, 
there is a convergence between the scores across communes. 
Table 6.3 shows the descriptive statistics for residual efficiency sco-
res as well as the rank correlations between those scores and the 
ones computed by the jackstrapped method. Firstly, to track the 
mobility of tax jurisdictions across different definitions of efficiency, 
we computed the rank correlations between DEA jackstrapped sco-
res and residual efficiency scores. The rank correlations are 0.60 
and 0.75, respectively, for the CRS and VRS variants. Secondly, for 
most communes, “pure” scores are lower than the “gross” ones. For 
instance, under the DEA-CRS and DEA-VRS variants, only 34% 
and 2%, respectively, of the municipalities have a “gross” efficiency 
score inferior to the residual one. The fact that this proportion is 
much lower – for all population groups – when the DEA-VRS was 
used is consistent with the fact that this variant envelops the DEA-
CRS model. 
Hence, in both DEA variants, the jackstrapped efficiency scores 
overestimate the “pure” efficiency scores. Such a result could be 
explained by the fact a significant part of the “gross” jackstrapped 
efficiency were due to environmental factor rather than a better 
management of tax revenues.
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Methodologies and 
Population Groups
Obs. 
(#)
Rank 
Correlation λk 
and Efk
Obs. for 
which   λk 
> Efk (%)
Efk Descriptive Statistics 
Mean Median
Std. 
Dev.
Skewness Kurtosis
         
DEA-CRS 2734 0.605 66% 0.235 0.215 0.107 2.198 9.159
  0 to 49,999 2343 0.611 64% 0.236 0.215 0.105 2.124 8.790
  50,000 to 299,999 352 0.616 82% 0.234 0.207 0.117 2.525 10.599
  >300,000 39 0.535 87% 0.235 0.218 0.101 2.624 10.690
         
DEA-VRS 2734 0.750 98% 0.173 0.152 0.096 2.512 10.776
  0 to 49,999 2334 0.748 97% 0.173 0.152 0.096 2.580 11.526
  50,000 to 299,999 356 0.793 100% 0.170 0.147 0.096 2.141 6.367
  >300,000 44 0.704 100% 0.187 0.159 0.083 1.841 4.208
When we disaggregate our results by size of the tax jurisdiction, 
we have a quite interesting result. Managerial tax efficiency, here 
measured by residual (“pure”) efficiency indexes, does not seems to 
differ significantly across different classes of population. Indeed the 
mean score variations are low among municipalities of different si-
zes. This result is only apparently surprising. It means that efficiency 
heterogeneity in terms of tax collection observed among Brazilian 
communes, particularly among small ones, is mainly caused by their 
specific environmental conditions, rather than by differences in their 
tax administration. 
Our findings suggest that to improve municipal tax efficiency we 
have to adopt different strategies according to the particular condi-
tions faced by the communes. Those with a substantial tax capacity 
and better socioeconomic conditions might improve efficiency by 
better management of controllable inputs by adopting programs that 
boost tax collection and reduce evasion. However, communes lacking 
both, tax capacity and good economic conditions, face a more dif-
ficult challenge, as the tax inefficiencies are due to external factors, 
outside their control. In such cases, improving tax administration 
should be part of a more coordinated strategy aiming to improve 
local development that would permit to expand and/or create their 
tax base. 
Table 6.3 - Descriptive Statistics for DEA-CRS and DEA-VRS Residual Tax 
Efficiency  Scores, Classified by Population Groups - 2004.
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Notice also that the positive kurtosis for all measures of tax effi-
ciency indicate that their efficiency distributions have fat tails re-
lative to the normal distribution. This phenomenon is so intense 
for the small cities that several of them present residual efficiency 
scores higher than the high scores of the big cities, indicating once 
again that their adverse environment and socioeconomic conditions 
accounts for most of their overall inefficiency. 
Lastly, to summarize our results, Table 6.4 presents the computed 
aggregate tax efficiency scores for both one-stage and two-stage ap-
proaches, measured as a weighted mean of individual scores. The 
weights are given by the tax share of the k-th municipality on total 
tax revenue.
Table 6.4 - Aggregate Tax Efficiency Scores for Brazilian Municipalities 2004. 
Methodologies 
Aggregate Tax Efficiency Scores
Technical Efficiency (λk) Residual Efficiency (Efk)
DEA-CRS 0.684 0.231
DEA-VRS 0.736 0.164
    
As we see, the overall tax performance of Brazilian municipalities 
has been quite disappointing. The low efficiency indexes here - the 
“gross” as well as the residual ones - show clearly that there is a 
wide space for increasing municipal tax effort. This conclusion is 
valid for small and larger cities as well as rich and poor ones. This 
result seems to imply that the Brazilian municipal tax jurisdiction 
lack appropriate incentives to adopt efficient tax systems by better 
exploring their tax base (when they have one), rationalizing their tax 
structure, and by reducing tax avoidance and evasion. 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper we first estimated the DEA-CRS and DEA-VRS tech-
nical tax efficiency scores for 2902 Brazilian municipalities by ap-
plying a method that combines bootstrap and jackknife resampling 
to eliminate the effect of outliers. Since tax efforts are affected by 
municipalities’ characteristics, which were not taken into account 
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in our DEA calculations, we included those factors in the analysis. 
To that end, we used econometric methods (including quantile re-
gression) to investigate how the excluded variables influenced the 
computed “gross” efficiency scores. The econometric results proved 
to be quite robust to the nonparametric efficiency variants used as 
dependent variable. 
Corroborating previous results, gross tax efficiency results show a 
clear relationship between the municipality’s size and urbanization 
and its efficiency scores. Scale variables – urbanization rate and 
population – have a positive and significant effect upon efficiency. 
Indeed, under both DEA variants, smaller cities tend to be less effi-
cient than larger ones hence indicating that size of the tax jurisdic-
tion is a relevant determinant of tax efficiency. Tax capacity factors 
also proved to be a key determinant of tax efficiency. Together, scale 
and capacity factors tend to imply that the price to pay for smaller 
tax jurisdictions is reduced productivity of tax collection. Hence, te-
chnical productivity of taxation could be improved mainly by small 
units becoming larger.
Our findings also suggest the existence of moral hazard problem in 
relationship between local tax jurisdictions and the central/state 
governments. Fiscal transfers granted to municipalities seem to act 
as a substitute for tax effort so that national taxpayers can finance 
local expenses. This point is particularly relevant for Brazil, whe-
re the design of fiscal transfers is totally disconnected from the 
municipalities’ performance regarding tax collection. Hence, if one 
wants to boost tax efficiency, it is imperative to change the rules for 
conceding these grants. 
Moreover, the efficiency heterogeneity observed among tax jurisdic-
tions are mainly caused by exogenous factors rather than by differen-
ces in their tax administration. The relatively low indexes, both at 
the individual and aggregated levels, show clearly that there is a wide 
space for increasing municipal tax effort in Brazil.  Such a result 
seems to imply that Brazilian communes lack not only appropriate 
incentive to increase tax efforts, but also a sound tax base.
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